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Recent Developments in OSHA
Litigation^
By Marshall J. Breger^
The author is Solicitor of Labor at the U. S. Department of Labor
After almost a year serving as the Solic-
itor of Labor, I can attest to the difficult
challenges the Department of Labor will
face and must overcome in the years
ahead if it is to continue to be a dynamic
and positive force in setting our Nation's
labor policy. Indeed, I believe that cur-
rent rulemaking and enforcement litiga-
tion on behalf of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration foreshadows
significant issues the Department must
resolve in the near future. This article
focuses on two such OSH Act^ issues of
current prominence: one, litigation chal-
lenges to OSHA rulemaking; and two, the
use of voluntary health and safety audits
in OSHA enforcement proceedings.
Rule Making Litigation
With respect to OSHA rulemaking,
there is growing concern over the trend by
the federal courts reviewing OSHA stan-
dards to demand from OSHA increasingly
rigorous and exhaustive justifications of
its rulemaking choices.'' Together with the
apparently inevitable legal challenge that
seems to follow the issuance of any OSHA
standard, that trend, if unchecked, may
lead to a future where OSHA's ability to
regulate health and safety standards in
our changing workplace is severely im-
paired. If OSHA and its lawyers do not
find the elixir that causes federal judges
to accept the agency's defense of its stan-
dards, to fulfill its statutory mandate,
OSHA will likely have to change the way
it approaches the standard setting func-
tion. It is time for OSHA to reflect deeply
on its administrative rulemaking
processes, and it is time as well for the
private sector to reflect on what kind of
rulemaking litigation it chooses to initi-
ate. ^
' Drawn from remarks at the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission Annual Meeting in Scottsdale,
Arizona. September 1. 1992. This article contains the per-
sonal views of the author and nothing herein should be
construed as stating the position of the U.S. Government,
the U.S. Department of Labor, or the Office of the Solicitor
of Labor.
2 I would like to thank for their insightful editorial assis.
tance in the preparation of this article Ann Rosenthal and
Barbara Werthmann, Counsels for Appellate Litigation, Sue
Wolff, Senior Trial Attorney, and Nicholas Levintow and
Bruce Justh, Staff Attorneys, Occupational Safety and
Health Division, Office of the Solicitor of Labor.
3 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 USC
651-678 (1988 and Supp. H 1990).
"AFL-CIO V. OSHA, 965 F2d 962 (11th Cir 1992), 1992
OSHD 1129.735 (air contaminants); UAW v. OSHA, 938
F2d 1310 (DC Cir 1991), 1991 OSHD 1129,399 (lockout/
tagout); UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F2d 389 (DC Cir 1989),
1989 OSHD H 28,564 (formaldehyde); Building & Construc-
tion Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F2d 1258 (DC
Cir 1988), 1988 OSHD H 28,134 (asbestos); National Grain
OSHA Litigation
& Feed Ass'n v. OSHA, 858 F2d 1019 (5th Cir 1988), 1988
OSHD H 28,337 (grain dust).
5 This dilemma is by no means unique to OSHA. Recent
commentary is replete with references to the "ossification of
rulemaking" [Peter L. Strauss, "Revisiting Overton Park:
Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions
Affecting the Community," 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1251 (1992))
and even to the "abandonment" by agencies of regulatory
efforts to improve safety [Jerry Mashaw & David Harfst,
"Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle
Safety," 4 YaleJ. on Reg. 257, 316 (1987), ascribing signifi-
cant responsibility for the National Highway Transporta-
tion Safety Administration's shift in emphasis from
"technology.forcing" safety regulation to recall adjudica-
tions to the inability of the agency to defend its rules
successfully against pre-enforcement challenges]. But the
application of the "substantial evidence" test, rather than
the relatively less stringent "arbitrary and capricious" test,
to OSHA rulemaking review proceedings places the agency
in a particularly unenviable position. See Shapiro & McGar-
rity, "Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Leg-
islative Reform," 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 9-10 (1989).
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Since 1971, OSHA has conducted about
70 notice-and-comment safety or health
rule makings. Most of them addressed spe-
cific safety hazards like fire, vehicle roll-
over, or excavation hazards.^ Some were
"generic" in the sense they addressed
health and safety hazards that are found
in virtually any workplace—examples
would be the Hazard Communication
Standard that requiring that workers be
informed of the hazards of chemicals pre-
sent at their workplaces and the Lockout/
Tagout Standard requiring that power
sources be de-energized whenever equip-
ment that could accidentally be started
up is being serviced or repaired.'' Twenty-
five of those rule makings focused in a
very comprehensive way on specific air
contaminants like lead, asbestos, coke
oven emissions, benzene, formaldehyde,
vinyl chloride, and cotton dust.^ Most of
these comprehensive air contaminant
rulemakings set permissible exposure lim-
its—the PELs. But in addition, they also
included a range of supporting ancillary
provisions such as medical monitoring,
training, housekeeping, hygiene, respira-
tor use and maintenance, and medical re-
moval protection.
Three judicial decisions have provided
the framework for much of the litigation
that has shaped OSHA's rulemaking ef-
forts: the Supreme Court decisions in the
benzene^ and cotton dust 1° cases and the
D.C. Circuit's first lead decision." Briefly
summarized, the benzene decision held
that section 3(8) of the OSH Act '^  re-
quired OSHA to establish that a hazard it
chose to regulate posed a significant risk
absent regulation and that the risk would
be ameliorated by the new standard. The
cotton dust ruling held that section
6(b)(5) 12 required that health standards
"assure," to the extent "feasible," that no
employee suffers material impairment of
health. The lead case included a remand
so that OSHA could consider the stan-
dard's feasibility for each affected indus-
try sector. •
The sad fact is that whenever the
agency regulators sent the final rule to
the Federal Register, thinking they had
finished the job, they had to curtail their
celebrations, because the inevitable peti-
tion for review arrived before the congrat-
ulatory speeches were finished. These
legal challenges typically came from both
sides—industry claiming the standard
was over-protective and too costly; labor
and public interest groups arguing that
the standard was not protective enough."
Thus, in almost every case, a rulemak-
ing—3 or 4 years in the making—became
little more than the opening volley for a
lawsuit. And then another year, two, or
three was taken up by the inevitable
court challenge.
The net effect of all this was two-fold.
First, OSHA's resources were concen-
trated on a relatively small pool of health
hazard rule makings—even though one of
Congress' overriding purposes in creating
OSHA was to establish an agency that
could evaluate and if necessary limit ex-
posures to what was already, in the 1960s,
a burgeoning universe of air contaminants
*See 29 CFR 19ia37(n), .38, .108, .156, .57, .57(b)(l),
.58, .58(bX3) and (4), .159, .160(bXl) and (c)(lXiv),
.160-.165 (fire); 29 CFR 1928.51, .52, .53 (vehicle roll over);
29 CFR 1926.650-.652 (excavation).
729 CFR 19iai2CX) (hazard communication), 29 CFR
1910.147 (Lockout/Tagout).
8 29 CFR 1910.1025 (lead), 1910.1001 (asbestos),
1910.1029 (coke oven emissions), 1910.1028 (benzene),
1910.1048 (formaldehyde), 1910.1017 (vinyl chloride), and
1910.1043 (cotton dust).
''Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute, 448 US 607 (1980), 1980 OSHD f 24,570.
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'" American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. Donovan, 452 US
490(1981), 1981 OSHD 1125,457.
" United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F2d 1189 (DC
Cir 1980), 1980 OSHD 1124,717, cert denied 453 US 913
(1981).
>2 29 u s e 652(8) (1988 and Supp. H 1990).
" 29 u s e 655(bX5) (1988 and Supp. H 1990).
'** See, e.g.. Building and Construction Trades Dept. v.
Brock, 838 F2d 1258 (DC Cir 1988), 1988 OSHD If 28,134,
involving challenges by both unions and industry groups to
OSHA's 1986 asbestos rule.
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in need of control.*^ Second, OSHA
rulemaking moved at a near glacial pace;
as the number of issues and the level of
evidentiary detail for each rulemaking ex-
panded, so did the time and resource in-
vestment and the amount of time from
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
final rule grew'^—only 27 health stan-
dards were promulgated between 1971
and 1988. '
In 1988, therefore, OSHA attempted to
address the problem of lengthy, compre-
hensive, single-substance rule makings by
regulating hundreds of air contaminants
in a single rulemaking—the PEL update
project.^'' The concept was that OSHA
would limit the rulemaking to setting ex-
posure limits only. There would be no
ancillary provisions like training, medical
removal protection, or medical monitor-
ing. In selecting exposure limits, OSHA
would rely heavily on the scientific con-
sensus on health effect issues of groups
like the American Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists and the Na-
tional Institute on Occupational Safety
and Health. Finally, the standard would
reflect practical realities of industrial life,
especially the facts that workplaces typi-
cally have more than one contaminant in
the air and that the ventilation, house-
keeping, and isolation techniques that can
control one contaminant can probably
control several.
After a refreshingly expedited rulemak-
ing—18 months—OSHA issued PELs for
428 air contaminants;'^ it set lower limits
for 212 previously regulated substances
and new limits for 164 previously unregu-
lated substances. The inevitable petitions
for review were filed by both labor and
employer interests, and in July 1992, the
Eleventh Circuit issued a decision that
accepted many of the policies and strate-
gies OSHA applied, including OSHA's
right to address multiple substances in a
single rulemaking, its right to defer ancil-
lary measures to another day, and its de-
termination that some of the less
dramatic health effects of air contami-
nants, like sensory irritation, are material
enough to justify regulation.'^ Unfortu-
nately, and quite unexpectedly, the court
also decided to vacate the entire standard,
even though the vast majority of the
PELs were not specifically challenged by
anybody at any time—not in the
rulemaking and not in the litigation.
The court thought vacatur was neces-
sary because of what it perceived as
"shortcomings" in OSHA's analysis sup-
porting the PELs. First, OSHA adopted
the new PELs based on findings that they
substantially reduced significant risk of
harm and were feasible to implement.
OSHA did not, however, attempt to quan-
tify the precise risks presented by expo-
sure to each of the substances regulated,^°
nor did it necessarily search for the most
protective PEL feasible. The court held
that OSHA was compelled by sections
3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the statute to do both.
It also held that OSHA's decision to assess
feasibility overall within large industry
groupings rather than for each substance
in each industry sub-sector where it may
be found was incompatible with a statu-
tory obligation to make specific feasibility
'•'' Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and
Heaith Act of 1970, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 142.143 (Comm.
Print).
"> Compare OSHA's first asbestos standard, 37 Fed. Reg.
11,318 (June 7, 1972), a preamble covering two Federal
Register pages promulgated six months after the proposal,
the current rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,612 (June 20, 1986), and a
12O.page preamble, promulgated 31 months after the propo-
sal. The first standard was upheld in its entirety on appel-
late review, WD v. Hodgson, 499 F2d 467 (DC Cir 1974),
while the more recent one generally survived, but has been
remanded for further consideration that has so far resulted
in two amendments, with 15-page and eight-page pream-
bles, and a new round of notice and comment rulemaking
OSHA Litigation
that has already consumed more than five years. Building
and Construction Trades Dept., AFL-CIO, 838 F2d 1258
(DC Cir 1988), 1988 OSHD H 28,134.
" 53 Fed. Reg. 20,980 (June 7, 1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 2363,
2372, 2374 (Jan. 19, 1989).
•8 54 Fed. Reg. 2332 et seq. (Jan. 1989) (codified at 29
CFR 1910.1000(1991)).
" 965 F2d 962, 972, 985, 975.
2° OSHA in this case utilized primarily direct evidence of
the harm caused by exposure to reported levels of the
regulated substances, rather than relying on mathematical
models to reach more precise-seeming significant risk assess-
ments. 54 Fed. Reg. 2364 (Jan. 1989).
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findings. Because, in the court's view,
these conceptual mistakes permeated the
entire rulemaking, the entire standard
had to be vacated.
In vacating the entire standard, the
panel appeared to violate the basic princi-
ple that injunctive relief should be no
more burdensome than is necessary to
provide complete relief to the plaintiff.^i
No court has a roving charter to correct
supposedly invalid action wherever it
may occur; courts are limited to taking
steps to provide full relief to those who
invoked its jurisdiction.^^ In this case,
none of the industry parties had standing
to object to all of the PELs, and the AFL-
CIO, which might have had standing to
do so, was arguing for stricter limits for
some substances and for inclusion of ancil-
lary provisions, not for rescission of the
entire standard.^^
There are, of course, many ironies here.
The court found vacatur necessary be-
cause it believed that OSHA exceeded its
legislative mandate—the statutory re-
quirements to find significant risk and to
set feasible standards. Thus, the court
eliminated a standard estimated to pre-
vent 700 deaths and 55,000 illnesses a
year in the name of legislative mandate.
If this decision stands,^'' OSHA air con-
taminant standards will revert to the orig-
inal 400 or so ACGIH threshold limits
from 1968 (adopted by OSHA in 1971) as
well as 25 comprehensive substance-spe-
cific standards promulgated by OSHA
since 1971. The ACGIH, however, has
long since moved beyond its 1968 findings
and issued over 600 threshold limits,
many based on more recent evidence and
stricter than the original 1968 limits.^s
And it is not only the judicial percep-
tion that the Act imposes rigorous de-
mands for specific findings to justify
health standards that has made it more
difficult for OSHA to promulgate stan-
dards. The D.C. Circuit's lockout/tagout
decision's could also have a significant
impact on the agency's ability to issue
sa/efy standards.
Historically, safety rulemaking has
been relatively noncontroversial. The ma-
jor judicial decisions reviewing OSHA
rules involved health standards. Most
safety standards were not even challenged
in court, and only one—grain dust—was
seriously claimed by industry to be un-
duly burdensome.^'' One reason for this is
that safety standards are generally much
less expensive than health standards.
Moreover, the benefits of safety rules—
the elimination of immediate deaths and
injuries—are more tangible than the ben-
efits of health rules, which are usually
designed to prevent exposures that will
lead to illness and death in the future.
It, therefore, came as a surprise when
the D.C. Circuit, in the lockout/tagout
decision, suggested that OSHA's safety
rulemaking authority might be so un-
restrained as to create a constitutional
problem. Since section 6(b)(5) applies
only to health standards, there is no statu-
tory requirement that OSHA set the most
protective standard that is feasible when
issuing safety standards. The lockout/
tagout court was concerned that, without
6(b)(5) as a constraint, OSHA was inter-
preting its safety rulemaking authority as
giving it unbridled discretion, once "sig-
nificant risk" is found, to make whatever
choice it wished: setting safety standards
so rigorous that they take industry to the
verge of economic ruin, doing nothing at
2' Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 US 682, 702 (1979).
^^ Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 175-176
(1803).
2^  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc.. 438 US 59, 78-80 (1978).
^'' Petitions for reconsideration of the decision have been
filed by the Secretary of Labor and the Inter-Industry Wood
Dust Coordinating Committee.
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" 54 Fed. Reg. 2372 (Jan. 19, 1989); 53 Fed. Reg. 20,963
20,967 (June 7,1988).
^ United Automobile Workers v. OSHA, 938 F2d 1310
(DC Cir 1991).
" National Grain & Feed Ass'n v. OSHA 858 F2d 1019
(5th Cir 1988).
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all, or doing anything in between. This
vast range in which OSHA could operate,
unrestrained, the court thought, by either
statutory criteria or by self-imposed re-
straints, led to its concern that Congress's
delegation of authority to OSHA was over
broad unless OSHA adopted a narrower
view of its safety rulemaking authority.
The court went on to suggest that cost-
benefit analysis would be one narrowing
criterion that could cabin OSHA safety
rulemaking authority, but it did not man-
date that OSHA take any particular cost
benefit route. Instead, it remanded for the
agency to identify "intelligible princi-
ples" that control its safety rulemaking
discretion.
After the lockout/tagout decision,
OSHA issued the Process Safety Manage-
ment Standard (PSM), In the preamble to
the PSM standard, OSHA explained why
it believed its safety rulemaking author-
ity was already sufficiently constrained to
avoid an over broad delegation problem.
For example, OSHA explained that it does
not view the requirement that standards
be feasible as permitting it to push indus-
tries to the "verge of economic ruin , , , It
would appear to be consistent with the
purposes of the Act to envisage the eco-
nomic demise of an employer who has
lagged behind the rest of the industry in
protecting employees and is consequently
unable to comply with new standards as
quickly as other employers," Since
OSHA's rule making actions must be con-
sistent with the rulemaking record, in-
cluding the evidence and arguments
presented by the proponents of a stan-
dard, a decision to do nothing in the face
of a rulemaking record that compels ac-
tion would invite reversal by a reviewing
court, A petitioner in the lockout/tagout
case recently filed a motion claiming that
OSHA had been dilatory in responding to
the court's remand to identify "intelligi-
ble principles" that control its safety
rulemaking discretion and asked for a
whole or partial stay of the lockout/
tagout standard to give OSHA an incen-
tive to comply, OSHA opposed and filed a
motion asking the court to dissolve the
remand on the basis that OSHA had ade-
quately addressed the remand issues: the
over broad delegation issue had been an-
swered in the PSM preamble, and all
other issues had been addressed in a sup-
plemental brief. The court denied both
motions, stating with respect to the over
broad delegation issue that OSHA's ac-
tions on the separate PSM rule cannot be
used to decide whether the lockout/tagout
standard conformed to law,^ ^
These recent decisions are best seen as
the culmination of the past twenty years
of litigation. Over the years, the relatively
general terms of the Act—that standards
be reasonably necessary or appropriate;
that health standards eliminate signifi-
cant risk to the extent feasible; that
OSHA findings be conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole^^—have come to be construed with
extraordinary elaboration and exactitude.
Thus, although the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision to vacate the entire PELs standard
was drastic and unforeseeable, its insis-
tence on the same level of rigor for each of
the 428 risk and feasibility determina-
tions normally provided in a substance-
specific standard is less surprising.^°
There have certainly been other appellate
court decisions calling for a very high
level of specificity in the record and the
^ Process Safety Management Standard, 57 Fed, Reg,
6356 (to be codified at 29 CFR 1910,119), See IUD v.
Hodgson, 499 F2d 467, 478 (DC Cir 1974) 1973-74 OSHD
H 17,618; 29 USC 655(f) (1988 & Supp, II 1990); 5 USC 553
(1988 & Supp, II 1990); United Automobile Workers v.
OSHA, Nos, 89-1559, 89-1657, 9ai533 (DC Cir October 6,
1992) per curiam opinion denying petitioner's motion to
enforce judgment and OSHA's motion to dissolve remand,
29 29 USC 652(8), 655(b)(5), 655(f) (1988 and Supp, II
1990),
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3° See John M, Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Sub-
stance Regulation: How Over Regulation Causes Under
Regulation at OSHA (1988), 237, urging the necessity of a
process similar to OSHA's PELs project but expressing
concern that "changing the exposure limits for a hundred
substances and adopting limits for two-hundred new ones
would be impossible given current rule-making require-
ments,"
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agency's analysis. Thus, while the D.C.
Circuit's first lead decision upheld
OSHA's significant risk and other health
related findings, it stayed the standard's
engineering control requirement during a
remand for the agency to make specific
feasibility determinations for 47 indus-
tries where OSHA had determined that,
because exposures were generally low,
compliance would require "very simple"
engineering controls. The stay for 41 of
those industries was finally lifted in 1990.
The remaining six industries challenged
OSHA's determinations that the standard
was feasible for them, and the agency was
forced into another round of litigation in
which it defended—successfully in five
out of the six cases —its conclusion that
compliance with the standard is feasible
for industry sectors as small as two com-
panies in one case. The court, however,
remanded yet again so that OSHA could
reconsider its finding that compliance
with the standard is also feasible for the
16-company brass and bronze ingot man-
ufacturing industry.^'
This judicial tendency to undertake an
extremely rigorous analysis—indeed what
some may call a "hard look" analysis"
when it comes to OSHA cases—even while
engaging in Chevrorfi^ deference in other
areas of administrative law—raises seri-
ous questions for the future of the OSHA
regulatory process, as well as that of other
agencies. Professor Richard Pierce uses
the example of Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission rulemaking to illustrate
the contention that "judicial demands
that agencies employ a synoptic approach
to the fact-finding and reasoning process
leading to a policy decision have so in-
creased the resources that agencies must
devote to a rulemaking, the years re-
quired to complete a rulemaking, and the
probability of judicial reversal at the end
of that long and expensive process, that
many agencies have abandoned their
prior efforts at systematic policy mak-
ing." Professor Pierce argues that the Su-
preme Court should "reduc[el the degree
of discretion reviewing courts now enjoy"
by reducing the permissible scope of the
adequate consideration doctrine as at
least a partial solution to this
While one may stand in awe of OSHA's
good faith efforts to elaborate in excruci-
ating detail every subtle nuance of its
ratiocination process—every twist and
turn of the rulemaking record—in order
to satisfy judicial commands for "rea-
soned" decision-making, from a litigation
perspective, the more detail provided, the
more grist for a lawyer to find possible
flaws. Professor Pierce has argued that
recent rulemaking decisions "seem to send
the message that the price of judicial ac-
quiescence in an agency policy decision is
detailed consideration of every alternative
that might strike the fancy of a particular
judge." '^^  From a policy perspective,
600-page rule makings may mean better
analyses, or they can merely confuse the
forest with the trees (using up, one might
add, a lot of forests). It is not clear that
this green eye shade approach always
leads to better regulations, or even en-
sures "searching and careful" review.
Given this troubling background, where
does OSHA go from here? The plain fact is
that appellate courts have increasingly
disregarded the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion in the cotton dust case "not [to] im-
pute to Congress a purpose to paralyze
with one hand what it sought to promote
with the other." ^^  As one noted commen-
tator on administrative law has stated in
an analogous context: "the court dis-
played a remarkable ability to sever the
aorta of (a Congressionally mandated na-
tional policy] in order to repair a per-
^' 647 F2d at 1301, 1311. American Iron and Steel Insti-
tute V. OSHA, 939 F2d 975, 993 (DC Cir 1991), 1991 OSHD
H 29,406.
^^  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counc/;. 467 US 837 (1984).
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^^  Richard J. Pierce. Jr., "Unruly Judicial Review of
Rulemaking," Nat. Resources & Environment (Fall 1990)
23.
•" Pierce, supra, at 49.
^^  452 US at 513 (internal quotes and citations omitted.)
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ceived defect in a capillary." ^^  It is
possible, of course, that the judicial pen-
dulum could swing back to more deference
to agency expertise and policy discretion
than has been accorded in recent years.^''
On the other hand, the pendulum might
simply come to rest, with neither increase
nor decrease in judicial scrutiny. And, at
least theoretically, the courts could nar-
row even more their deference to agency
expertise and policy discretion, since all
expertise and policy issues are heavily
freighted with factual aspects suitable for
judicial review.''^
The regulated community also has a
great deal to say about the future course
of OSHA rulemaking simply by the litiga-
tion it initiates. On that score, industry
needs to decide whether employers are
really better off by precipitating litiga-
tion leading to a PELs-type decision. Af-
ter all, in the OSHA context, unlike the
situation facing other regulatory agencies,
when there is no standard in place, the
general duty clause applies.^^ By its na-
ture the general duty clause is less consis-
tent in its effects on industry than are
standards.'*" From the employer perspec-
tive, uniformity is desirable for many rea-
sons. Indeed, many employers supported
the OSH Act in the first place out of a
desire for nationwide uniformity that
would eliminate competitive and other
disadvantages among employers subject
to varying state and local health and
safety laws. And a court order vacating a
standard not only removes that standard
from the scene, it diverts OSHA resources
from the development of other unifying
regulations when OSHA shifts resources to
comply with a remand or to salvage liti-
gated standards with supplemental or cor-
rective rulemaking.
In the same vein, on the labor and
public interest side, one cannot help but
think of two adages: Be careful what you
wish for, you may get it; do not let the
best be the enemy of the good. Labor and
public interest groups have challenged
virtually every health standard OSHA has
issued in recent years—even though I as-
sume they would have agreed that the
standards in question provided significant
protection. The purpose of these labor and
public interest lawsuits appeared to be
fine-tuning, to add protections, and it
may be that these additional protections
were significant. But, by any realistic
measure, they were only add-ons to the
major health benefits of the standard
under attack. Further, petitions that suc-
ceed in eliciting an order to the agency to
consider additional measures all too often
also succeed in generating satellite litiga-
tion about the pace of the remand, or
whether OSHA's remand activity is good
enough."*' We must endeavor to ensure
that the fine-tuning of a handful of stan-
^ Pierce, supra., at 23, 25. The article argues that dam-
age was done by overzealous judicial reviewers to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission's efforts to establish
national natural gas pricing policies, and notes similar im-
pediments faced by other agencies, including OSHA.
^'Several commentators have urged that the Supreme
Court or Congress require such a shift. See Ashley C. Brown;
"The Over judicialization of Regulatory Decision Making,"
JVal. Resources & Environment (Fall 1990), 20; Ronald M.
Levin; "Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
Law", 74 Minn. L. Rev. 689 (1990); Peter L. Strauss,
"Considering Political Alternatives to Hard Look Review,"
1989 Duke L. J. 538. But see Cass R. Sunstein, "On the
Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action," 1989 £>uie L. J. 522 (concluding that aggressive
judicial review is beneficial).
^ Without commenting here on the merit of this view, it
is interesting to note that the PELs court stated that
legislative amendment might be the only practical way for
OSHA to make major strides towards more efficient
rulemaking, AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F2d 962,987 (11th Cir
OSHA Litigation
1992), and OSHA reform legislation was an issue in the last
congress. See H.R. 3160, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) and
H.Rep. No. 663 (Part I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S.
1622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) and S.Rep. No. 453, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
^' 29 USC 654(a)(l) (1988) (Supp. H 1990).
^International Union UAW v. General Dynamics Land
Sys. Div, 815 F2d 1570 (DC Cir), 1986.87 OSHD f 27,873,
cert, denied, 484 US 976 (1987).
"" Between the time the D.C. Circuit remanded the ethy-
lene oxide standard to OSHA to consider adoption of a short
term exposure limit. Public Citizen Health Research Group
V Tyson. 796 F2d 1479 (DC Cir 1986), 1986«7 OSHD
f 27,640, and promulgation of such a limit two years later,
53 Fed. Reg. 11,414 (April 6, 1988), petitioners complained
repeatedly to the court that OSHA's remand activity was
not proceeding quickly enough. See, e.g.. Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Brock, 823 F2d 626 (DC Cir
1987), 1987 OSHD 127,985. Other interim orders were
unre ported.
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dards does not end up occupying vast
tracts of OSHA resources and displacing
rulemaking initiatives for other serious
hazards.
Voluntary Compliance Audits
An area of growing legal and policy
concern is the question of OSHA's access
to and use of internal safety and health
audits performed by an employer. During
the course of an agency investigation of
the International Paper Company's plant
in Selma, Alabama, the OSHA compliance
officer uncovered evidence of numerous
possible violations of several safety stan-
dards. In pursuing that evidence, OSHA
also learned of a company-wide Safety
Compliance Audit Program, and the De-
partment delivered a written request to
the company seeking any safety compli-
ance audits and accident investigation re-
ports for the three previous years and also
requested the safety and maintenance
work orders for a one-month period in the
current year. The company refused to pro-
vide any of the requested documents.
The Department then issued a sub-
poena seeking the same documents. The
company ultimately provided all the sub-
poenaed documents except for the safety
compliance audits. The Secretary sought
enforcement of the subpoena in United
States District Court, and the company
resisted partly on the legal ground that
the Secretary's subpoena authority in sec-
tion 8(b) of the Act does not permit the
Secretary to subpoena voluntary em-
ployer self-audits.'^^ jjjg Department
pointed out that the Secretary's subpoena
authority under section 8(b) is stated in
the broadest terms possible, and is not
qualified by any other terms in the Act.
The drafters of the Act recognized the
need for broad subpoena powers, since the
Act represented an entry by the govern-
ment "into an area of broad national re-
sponsibility, [and] corresponding authority
must be delegated to the Secretary in
order that he may carry out this responsi-
bility . . . [The Act] grants the Secretary of
Labor a subpoena power of books, records
and witnesses —a power which is custom-
ary and necessary for the proper adminis-
tration and regulation of an occupational
safety and health statute." ''^
The Department also pointed to an ex-
tensive body of case law establishing that
section 8(b) is not limited by any other
terms of the A ^ ^
The most intriguing argument raised
by the company, and one which this sec-
tion of the article will focus on, was based
on policy concerns: that producing these
documents would have a chilling effect on
its voluntary efforts to comply with the
OSH Act. The district court held, clearly
correctly, that such arguments were prop-
erly addressed to the policy making au-
thority of the Secretary and were no
defense to the exercise of the subpoena
authority under section 8(b) '^^ of the Act.
It enforced the subpoena."*^
During the course of this litigation, ma-
jor employer organizations expressed their
*^ Section 8(b) authorizes the Secretary "[i]n making his
inspections and investigations under this Act [to] require
the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the produc-
tion of evidence under oath." 29 tJSC 657(b).
••^  Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, H.R. Rep. No. 1291,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (report accompanying H.R. 16785),
reprinted in Staff of Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 at 852; see id.
at 152 (report accompanying S. 2193).
"See Dole v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 904 F2d 867,
871-74 (3d Cir), 1990 OSHD H 28,839, cert den 111 SCt 555
(1990) (subpoena authority not limited to scope of employee
complaint); Donovan v. Union Packing Co. of Omaha, 714
F2d 838, 839-40 (8th Cir 1983), 1983 OSHD 1(26,643 (sub-
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poena authority not limited to comprehensive inspections,
subpoena authority not dependent on warrant); Marshall v.
American Olean Tile Co., 489 FSupp 32 (ED Pa 1980), 1980
OSHD 1124,337, affirmed 636 F2d 1209 (3d Cir 1980)
(subpoena authority not limited by six-month statute of
limitations for issuance of citations); United States v. West-
ingbouse Electric Corp, 638 F2d 570, 574-75 (3d Cir 1980),
1980 OSHD K 24,879 (subpoena authority not limited by
NIOSH regulation); Dote v. Bailey, No. CA3-89-2539-D
(ND Tex 1990), 14 OSHC (BNA) 1534, 1536 (subpoena
authority not limited but augmented by OSHA's Field Oper-
ations Manual).
"5 29 USC 657(b) (1988 and Supp. H 1990).
•** Martin v. Hammermill Paper Div., International Pa.
per Co., 1992 OSHD f 29,800 (ED Ala July 24,1992).
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dismay over the subpoena enforcement to
the Department, The legal and policy is-
sues underlying this case will continue to
be a significant source of discussion. Pri-
marily, it needs to be emphasized that the
debate is not over the Department's legal
right of access to this information, which
it incontrovertibly has, but over the use to
which the audit information will ulti-
mately be put,'*'' In addition, it should be
made clear at the outset that the debate
does not directly concern records or infor-
mation required to be kept by statute or
regulation. Section 8(c)(l) of the Acf**
authorizes the Secretary to impose record-
keeping requirements by regulation "as
necessary or appropriate," This statutory
authorization expressly provides that such
regulations may require employers to con-
duct periodic inspections. As to records of
self-inspection required to be maintained
by regulation, therefore, it seems clear
that the Secretary has a free hand to
review this information.
The theoretical issues can be fairly said
to fall into three categories. Most immedi-
ately, there is the question of process: how
should OSHA's policy regarding internal
safety and health audits be developed?
Secondly, there are definitional issues:
what kinds of information are involved?
Finally, there are mutuality issues: what
are the reasonable trade-offs among em-
ployers, employees, and OSHA to achieve
voluntary compliance with the OSH Act
and at the same time to preserve essential
enforcement incentives? It is not my pur-
pose to offer solutions to any of these
issues, but instead to explore the major
questions which must be addressed in or-
der to reach those solutions.
Consideration of these issues must be
informed by recognition that achievement
of the OSH Act's goal of a safe and health-
ful workplace for all employees depends
primarily upon employers' voluntary com-
pliance with the Act, Unlike Agriculture's
meat-inspection programs'*^ or MSHA's
mine-inspection program,5° OSHA does
not have and will never have compliance
, officers in every workplace. On the other
hand, voluntary compliance with the law
is a fundamental premise of our whole
system of government "of laws, not of
men," ^' Therefore, platitudes are not
likely to be helpful in reaching concrete
solutions to these difficult questions.
Turning now to the first issue of pro-
cess, namely, how should OSHA's
voluntary compliance policy be devel-
oped, the fundamental question is
whether "case-by-case" or "step-by-step"
development is preferable to a systematic
articulation. Reflecting our historical bias
towards "common law" issue develop-
ment, for the first 22 years of OSHA his-
tory, a step-by-step process has been
utilized. Its policies regarding self-audits
have run the gamut from mandated self-
audits in such cases as the lead and pro-
cess safety management standards to
agreed audits in citation settlement agree-
ments to the voluntary audits in the for-
mal Voluntary Protection Program
(VPP),^^ This step-by-step process has the
distinct benefit of building on prior expe-
rience in formulating the evolution of le-
gal policy.
There are at least three affected con-
stituencies. There is the employer commu-
nity, which ranges from large corporations
with substantial resources devoted to
safety and health programs to small em-
' "The subpoena power of Section 8(b), in addition to
supporting the Secretary's enforcement program, is used to
obtain data for future OSHA standards, see Marshall v.
Olean Tile Co., 489 FSupp 32 (ED Pa), affirmed 636 F2d
1209 (3d Cir 1980), and to assist the Secretary of Heaith
and Human Services and NIOSH In carrying out research
investigations. See General Motors Corp. v. NIOSH, 636
F2d 163 (6th Cir 1980), 1981 OSHD 1125,027; United States
V. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 FSupp 1027 (ED Wis 1980),
1980 OSHD 1124,666,
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^ 29 USC 657(c)(I) (1988 and Supp, II1990),
*' 21 USC 603 (1988 and Supp, II1990),
50 30 USC 813 (1988 and Supp, II1990),
5' Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137,163 (1803),
52 29 CFR 19I0,1025(n)(l)(iead); 29 CFR
1910,119(oKPSM); 47 Fed, Reg, 29,025 (1982) (VPP pro-
gram).
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ployers who have far less intensive pro-
grams, if any at all. The employees who
are the protected class under the statute
may be represented by knowledgeable
and active unions, more indirectly by
public interest groups, or not at all. Fi-
nally, the Department's various enforce-
ment agencies have a responsibility to
protect the integrity of the statutes they
implement and promote compliance with
the agency's regulatory policies. Provid-
ing adequate opportunity for input to all
these interested groups is not an easy
task.
Turning now to the constellation of
"definitional" issues, the general question
is what kind of employer-generated infor-
mation should be included in any OSHA
policy on self-audits? Does any kind of
employer inquiry into its safety and
health practices qualify or should some
standards be articulated? For example, in
1989, OSHA published Safety and Health
Program Management Guidelines.^^ The
guidelines call for a comprehensive pro-
gram of work site analysis, including (1)
baseline and update surveys of working
conditions, operations, and job hazards,
(2) periodic self-inspections, (3) accident
and "near-miss" investigations, and (4)
an analysis of injury and illness trends
over time. Should OSHA policy vary ac-
cording to whether an employer's audit
complies with these guidelines? Are the
inquiries of safety and health committees
covered? Insurance company investiga-
tions? Consultant's reports? Should the
policy vary according to whether employ-
ees participate in or have access to the
audits? Should employees and employee
representatives participate in some fash-
ion in the decision on release of the au-
dits? Should OSHA's definitions be
consistent with those of other agencies?
One agency that has adopted a general
policy on self-audits, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), has chosen to
define these issues narrowly to exclude
from the policy any activities required by
law or regulation. Further caveats limit
the covered self audits to those that are
"systematic, documented, periodic, and
objective" reviews of facility operations
related to meeting environmental require-
ments. All monitoring requirements or re-
sults required by law, regulation, or
permit fall out of the definition. The self-
audits covered by the policy will be re-
quested only if deemed necessary to ac-
complish EPA's statutory mission, and
the policy does not apply at all to any
documents or information deemed rele-
vant to any administrative or judicial pro-
ceedings.^''
Another definitional issue involves how
such a policy would relate to information
which employers are independently re-
quired to maintain. For example, the lead
standard requires that employers perform
a number of self-audits directed at spe-
cific issues, such as air lead levels, respira-
tor usage, and engineering controls. Is the
information gathered during these audits
to be treated as though it is all mandated
by the standard or can it be segregated
into information required by law and in-
formation voluntarily acquired? Certain
employers, such as those covered by the
process safety management standard, are
required by law to conduct comprehensive
safety and health audits: Should these em-
ployers be excluded from the policy alto-
gether?
Finally, there are the "mutuality" is-
sue: that is the bargain that may be
struck between OSHA and employers in
order to encourage active voluntary com-
pliance with the Act. The obvious encour-
agement is that if the employer discovers
a problem and corrects it before OSHA
ever shows up, it will not be cited or
penalized for violations. That in itself is a
significant incentive for voluntary audits,
despite the contrary claims of some who
have argued that without the promise of a
safe harbor no employer will conduct a
53 54 Fed. Reg. 3904-3916 (Jan. 26, 1989).
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voluntary audit, and no lawyer will allow
his client to undertake one. These predic-
tions, however, are based on the assump-
tion that businessmen in the ordinary
course of their business have no economic
or social interest in the health and safety
of their employees, and that absent the
promise of a safe harbor, employers will
not seek to learn what they must know to
protect their employees and go about the
business of securing such protection. That
is simply not the case. Such an argument
fails to acknowledge that the regulated
community is aware that OSHA has in-
sisted on obtaining such information. In
addition to the caselaw, longstanding pro-
visions of OSHA's Field Operations Man-
ual (FOM) and several agency Directives
and Instructions give notice that OSHA
will seek voluntary audits.^^
Precisely this issue was addressed in a
recent decision of the Ninth Circuit ^^
holding that voluntary safety audits are
not protected from disclosure by a privi-
lege of self-critical analysis or so-called
"self-evaluative" privilege.^'' In that case,
the first mate on a cruise ship slipped on
leaking oil and injured himself. The court
held that the employer was required to
turn over minutes of the ship's Safety
Committee meetings (which referred to
the leaking mechanism), finding in part
that the information failed to meet one of
the tests that the claimed privilege is
predicated on: that the information be of
the type whose flow would be curtailed if
discovery were allowed. Without actually
ruling on whether a "self-critical analy-
sis" privilege exists, the court stated that
voluntary audits are rarely curtailed sim-
ply because they may be subject to dis-
covery in litigation. Noting that
companies typically conduct such audits
to avoid litigation resulting from unsafe
conditions, the court found ironic the
claim that such candid assessments will
be inhibited by the fear that they could
later be used as a weapon in the hypothet-
ical litigation they are intended to pre-
vent. In any event, whatever may be the
status of the "self-critical analysis" privi-
lege in private litigation, no court has
applied it where the documents in ques-
tion have been sought by a government
Assuming workable solutions exist to
such definitional problems as identifying
which voluntary audits are worthy of spe-
cial treatment, it may be possible to work
out guidelines as to the conditions under
which OSHA will ask for copies of the
audits in its compliance investigations. It
is certainly also possible for a system of
citation preferences to include the situa-
tion where the company audit meets the
Department's standard and the problem
is being corrected, but abatement is not
yet complete at the time of the inspection.
For example, treating the self-audit as a
mitigating factor in the penalty sought
could be an important incentive to
voluntary compliance.
Incentives already exist for employers
to conduct and act on voluntary safety
and health audits of their workplaces. The
OSH Act itself provides two important
motivations for an employer's voluntary
compliance: (1) both history and good
faith are taken into account in assessing
penalties; (2) willful and repeated viola-
tions carry substantially more serious con-
sequences than other types of violations.^^
Employers regularly defend citations and
penalties on the grounds that they have
implemented sound and effective safety
*^  See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Samsonite Corp., No.
91-N-38 (DC Colo March 7 and August 20, 1991), 1991
OSHD 1129,381; Secretary of Labor v. American Mutual
Ins. Co.'s, No. 83-1029-MA (D. Mass. May 12, 1983) 1983
OSHD 1 26,560; OSHA Instruction CPL 2.45B; OSHA No-
tice CPL 2; OSHA Instruction CPL 2.80.
^ Dowling V. American Hawaii Cruises, (9th Cir No.
91-15153, Aug. 4, 1992) Lexis No. 17590; Westlaw No.
WO-182769.
OSHA Litigation
" See, James F. Flanagan, "Rejecting a General Privilege
for Self-Critical Analyses," 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551 (May
1983) (arguing against a broad-based evidentiary privilege
for self-critical analyses).
58 FTC V. TRW, 628 F2d 207, 210 (DC Cir 1980); Emer-
son Electric Co. v. Rumsfeld, 609 F2d 898 (8th Cir 1979);
See United States v. Noall, 587 F2d 123 (2d Cir 1978).
5' 29 USC 666 (1988 and Supp. H 1990).
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and health programs, including self-au-
dits,^ OSHA may want to focus its atten-
tion on identifying ways a voluntary
audit policy could work in conjunction
with these existing motivations. By the
same token, reports of self-inspections are
often extremely pertinent to these issues,
as well as to such important statutory
considerations as knowledge, gravity, and
exposure. Since the statute places an em-
ployer's state of mind at issue, whatever
general policy may ultimately be adopted
would have to be structured to be consis-
tent with the Secretary's ability to ad-
dress that issue, as well as other issues the
Act makes relevant.
In addition to employer self-interest
motivations built into the statutory struc-
ture, OSHA has developed an affirmative
incentive program which might be a fer-
tile source of ideas: the Voluntary Protec-
tion Program, The essential foundation
for the VPP is the employer's self-inspec-
tion and correction of hazards based on
the high safety and health standards
OSHA has established for employers who
agree to participate, A VPP application
must also set out the employer's system
for holding managers accountable for
safety and health, describe safety and
health training programs for employees
(as well as demonstrate the ways employ-
ees are involved in the safety and health
program), and provide for the protection
of contract employees. But one of the
most significant requirements is the self-
inspection and hazard correction require-
ment, A VPP applicant must describe its
hazard assessment procedures in detail,
show how hazard assessment findings are
incorporated in planning decisions, train-
ing programs, and operating procedures.
and agree to provide voluntarily to OSHA
its self-inspection and accident investiga-
tion records, its safety committee min-
utes, its monitoring and sampling results,
and its annual Safety and Health pro-
gram evaluation. Moreover, the VPP ap-
plicant must pledge to correct in a timely
manner all hazards identified through
self-inspections, employee reports or acci-
dent investigations, and to provide the
results of these investigations to its em-
ployees,^'
In addition to other recognitions, par-
ticipating employers are removed from
general schedule (or programmed) inspec-
tions, VPP participation may be cost-pro-
hibitive for many employers and, in any
event, is reserved for those companies
which demonstrate exemplary compliance
with the OSH Act, That model, therefore,
may not have a broad enough focus for
the voluntary audit issue. The questions
then are what rewards and incentives
should be provided to employers with a
commitment to voluntary audits of safety
and health in the workplace that does not
match the VPP level, and what is the
compensating payback to OSHA,
These are some of the problems facing
OSHA as it grapples with the difficult
questions posed above. In searching for
answers, one must remember that in the
jurisprudence of OSHA, one receives sal-
vation by works, not by faith alone. And
confession—in the form of a voluntary
audit—cannot in itself ensure absolution.
Rather, one must engage in repentance—
that is to say abatement—to avoid the
strictures of the Act,
[The End)
'*See, e.g., Daniel International Corp. v. OSHRC, 683
F2d361 (llthCir 1982), 1982 OSHD f 26,185.
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